We provide a general framework in which to determine the optimal penalty fee inducing the contractor to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We do this by developing a real option model that enables us to investigate the contractor's value of investment timing flexibility which the penalty rule -de facto -introduces. We then apply this setting in order to evaluate the range of penalty fees in the Italian legislation on PPCs. According to our calibration analysis, there is no evidence that the substantial delays recorded in the execution times of Italian PPCs are due to incorrectly set penalty fees. This result opens the way for other explanations of delays in Italian PPCs: specifically, we extend our model to investigate the probability of enforcing a penalty which we assume negatively affected by the "quality" of the judicial system and the discretionality of the court in voiding the rule. Our simulations show that the penalty fee is highly sensitive to the "quality" of the judicial system. Specifically referring to the Italian case, we show that the optimal penalty should be higher than those set according to the present Italian law. Padua, EAERE 2007, EARIE 2008, EEA 2008 Abstract This paper provides a general framework to determine the optimal penalty fee to induce a contractor to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We did this by i) developing a real option model to evaluate the investment timing ‡exibility that the inclusion of a penalty clause in the contract gives the contractor; ii) investigating the probability of enforcing the penalty rule which is here assumed to be negatively a¤ected by the 'quality' of the judicial system and by the discretionality of the court in voiding the penalty rule itself. Our model shows that the optimal penalty fee increases as the uncertainty over the contract's investment costs increases and the probability of the penalty enforcement decreases.
Introduction
The deterioration of public …nance and increase in global competition have forced governments and public institutions to obtain "the best value for money"through the purchase of goods, works and services in the form of procurement contracts. E¢ cient public procurement contracts (henceforth PPCs) are thus emerging as a "core necessity for ... the public sector's e¤ectiveness in obtaining resources for social spending and/or lowering taxes" (Dimitri et al., 2006) . These contracts have recently recorded a rapid increase both in number and value, reaching 16% of the GDP in the EU, and around 20% in the United States. 1 However, PPCs have both bene…ts and costs: the bene…ts (e.g. allocative and productive e¢ ciency) can be quickly erased by the costs and all the other consequences that usually arise from contractual incompleteness. 2 Delays in PPC execution times are often a negative by-product; therefore, penalties for delay in delivering are speci…cally addressed in the contract by the procurer to provide the contractor the right incentive to prevent such default. 3 Indeed, delays in delivering negatively a¤ect many of the actors involved, e.g. they may determine direct costs for the procurer and reduce consumers'utility. A typical illustrative example is a PPC for roadway resurfacing, rehabilitation and restoration: if these activities are undertaken in heavily urbanized areas, they may cause extreme tra¢ c congestion and severe inconvenience to the travelling public and the business community. Thus, delays in the completion of these works prolong the negative impact on users (i.e. a social cost), and also cause overruns in the planned execution costs. 4 To avoid these inconveniences, the procurer -a Contracting Authority, henceforth CA -usually includes in the PPC a penalty fee for each day of delay the contractor produces in the delivery date. 5 However, a contractor may be unwilling to respect contractual times if its gain from defaulting is larger than the penalty to be paid. The recent Italian experience of PPCs has highlighted that this issue is relevant: there is puzzling evidence that consistent delays are still present regardless of the fact that explicit penalty clauses are included in the contract. Indeed, our simple descriptive analysis 6 shows that out of 45,370 completed contracts in the period 2000-2006, about 78% were completed with delays.This discrepancy raises the following research questions: a) is there something wrong with the de…ntion of penalty fees currently set? b) how should this penalty be optimally set to induce the contractor to respect the contracted delivery date?
In order to answer these questions, this paper provides a general framework to determine the optimal penalty fee in a PPC contract. Our starting point is that the inclusion of a penalty clause gives the contractor -to some extent -the option of deciding the investment timing for the contract's execution. In order to be e¤ective, the penalty fee should consider the value of the investment timing ‡exibility which, de facto, increases the contract value. To correctly approach 1 Note that between 1995 and 2002 PPCs in the EU underwent a 31% increase in value (Dimitri, et al., 2006; Ch.1.) See also: http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/publicprocurement/index_en.htm 2 The economic and engineering literature give di¤erent explanations for the main issues arising in PPCs. Most of the economic analysis on this topic focuses on the information asymmetry concerning production costs between the supplier and the procurer (La¤ont and Tirole, 1993 ) while engineering and construction management analysis concentrates on the uncertainty which a¤ects the contract after it has been signed and its e¤ects on both the supplier and the procurer (Bartholomew, 1998) . For a methodological discussion on contract incompleteness and unforeseen contingencies see Maskin and Tirole (1999) . 3 In the economic literature on PPCs, delivery delays in contract execution are often considered along with the issue of the supplier's performance regarding contracted aims (i.e. quality). See on this Engel A.R. et al. (2006) . 4 Cost overruns in di¤erent procurement contracts have been speci…cally addressed in the seminal paper by Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and, more recently, by Ganuza (2007) . 5 According to the actual practice in PPCs, the penalty for delay in contracts execution is a fee per day of delay usually de…ned as a percentage of the contract value. As an example, in Italy penalty fees range from 0.03% to 0.1% of the contract value for each day of delay (see Government Decree n. 163/2006 and DPR n. 554/1999). As far as the united States are concerned, Herbsaman et al. (1995, Table 6, p. 276) show that for PPCs in highway construction, the Kansas Department of Transportation usually sets penalties ranging from 0:03% to 0:3% of the contract value for each day of delay. Arditi et al. (1997) show that a similar range of penalty is applied by the Illinois Department of Transportation. 6 See details in Section 2 below, where we present our analysis on the database compiled by the Italian Authority in charge of controlling PPCs (i.e. Autorità per la Vigilanza sui Contratti Pubblici di Lavori, Servizi e Forniture -AVCP ). See also AVLP (2005) . the issue, we propose a simple Real Option model which makes it possible to ascertain the value of option to delay induced by the inclusion of a penalty clause in the contract. 7 Moreover, to correctly address the above research questions, we should take into consideration elements a¤ecting the enforcement of the penalty rule itself. Following results generally acknowledged in the -scarce -literature on judicial enforcement of contracts, a low probability of penalty enforcement can arise when:
8 i) the court of law -to which the parties refer to for settlement of the dispute on the penalty payment -has discretionality in reducing, or even in not enforcing, the committed fee;
9 ii) default by the contractor triggers costly and time-consuming litigation. We include these elements in our model setting the probability of penalty enforcement as related both to the level of the penalty (as discretionality in enforcement of PPCs by a court of law increases with the committed penalty's amount) and to a measure of the 'quality'of the judicial system. This paper mainly refers to two di¤erent strands of literature. On a formal level, it builds on the value of ‡exibility in contract investment timing (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) . In regard to economic literature on judicial enforcement of contracts, our paper stems from studies on the probability of a penalty rule's enforcement. Referring to Guash et al. (2006) -who investigated the probability of renegotiation of concession contracts when corruption is present -in our model we assume that the probability of enforcing the penalty is a¤ected by the 'quality'of the judicial system. Speci…cally, in the calibration of our model we rely -as in Bianco et al. (2005) -on an indicator of judicial ine¢ ciency which measures the length of ordinary civil trials. The source of the court's discretionality in enforcing the penalty is discussed by Anderlini et al. (2007) as a way to recognize ex-post some ex-ante unforseen events 10 : in our model we assume that the court's discretionality in enforcing the rule increases with the amount of the committed penalty; that is, the higher amount of the penalty to be paid by the contractor, the greater the court's probability of deciding whether to void or enforce the contract.
Our paper shows that the optimal penalty fee to be set in a PPC -i.e. the penalty which should induce the contractor to respect the contracted delivery date -increases as the uncertainty over the contract's investment costs increases and the probability of the penalty's enforcement decreases. The model's theoretical predictions are supported by our calibration results: using parameters which mimic the Italian context for PPCs, our …ndings show that, …rst, in accordance with Real Option Theory, the higher the uncertainty over the future realization of the investment costs, the higher the penalty fee should be; and, second, the penalty fee should be set by considering the probability of penalty enforcement which -in turn -is correlated to the discretionality of the court and to the 'quality'of the judicial system. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2, summarizes a variety of empirical evidence dealing with delays and the probability of judicial enforcement in Italian PPCs. Section 3 …rst describes a basic model for procurement contracts which includes a penalty rule for delay in completion, and further then presents simulations carried out adopting a range of parameters which refer to the Italian empirical evidence in procurement. Finally, Section 4 provides a brief summary of our …ndings policy. Appendix A shows how our base model can be extended to consider a penalty/premium scheme where the contractor is punished (or rewarded) if it decides to delay (or anticipate) the delivery date. Appendix B contains additional tables for evidence discussed in Section 2, and further simulations and …gures referring to key parameters of the model. 7 As Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1985; 1986) highlighted in their seminal works, there is a close analogy between security options and investment timing ‡exibility. 8 In our analysis we assume that delays in delivering the project are always veri…able; our focus is not on veri…ability of delays. A non-veri…able task could threaten contract enforceability itself (La¤ont and Martimort, 2002, p.348 ). To our knowledge, since the seminal paper by Manelli and Vincent (1995) , analysis on non-veri…able tasks in procurement (and concession) contracts has been carried out -with di¤ering emphases -by Dalen et al. 1 0 Usman (2002) shows that the discretional nature of the court's e¤ort can act strategically in verifying the contract's contingencies. 3 2 Delays and penalty enforcement in Italian PPCs
Empirical evidence of delays in Italian PPCs
To investigate delays in PPCs we accessed the database compiled by the Italian Authority in charge of controlling these contracts (Autorità per la Vigilanza sui Contratti Pubblici di Lavori, Servizi e Forniture -AVCP ). This database records all public works contracts of a value between 150,000 and 15,000,000 Euros awarded by municipalities, local/regional public authorities and public …rms. At …rst glance, our examination of this database highlights that out of 45,370 fully completed contracts in the period 2000-2006, about 35,312 (corresponding to about 78%) were completed with delays.
In Table 1A in the Appendix, these contracts are presented with respect to i) the awarding procedure (open, negotiated and non-classi…ed -n.c.); ii) their values (from e 150,000 to e 500,000; from e 500,000 to e 1,000,000; from e 1,000,000 to e 5,000,000; from e 5,000,000 to e 15,000,000; larger than e 15,000,000) and iii) the regional area where they were carried out (Northern, Central and Southern Italy). 11 It is interesting to note that the number of awarded PPCs is higher in the Northern part of Italy than in the Central and Southern parts (about three times more than those awarded in Central and in Southern Italy), and most of these contracts fall in the smallest range of values (more than 60% of the total PPCs recorded fall in the range between 150,000 and 500,000 Euros).
Italian data shows that the PPCs awarded with an open procedure are more than double those with a negotiated one. Moreover, the average days of delay does not appear to di¤er according to the nature of the awarding procedure itself:
12 out of the 30,244 contracts awarded with an open procedure, about 80% had delays while out of the 13,189 contracts awarded with a negotiated procedures, 75% had delays. 14 This suggests that there is not a functional relationship between delays and contract value; the reduction in the ratio, illustrated in Figure 1 , could simply be due to the reduction in the average days of delay (numerator) or to an increase in contracted days (denominator) or to a combination of the two. 15 1 1 The distinction among these three macro-regions has been made by referring to the de…nition by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) according to which, Italy can be divided in: Northern Italy (which comprises Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta, Liguria, and Lombardia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna); 2) Central Italy (Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio); 3) Southern Italy (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata e Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna). 1 2 Italian regulation on PPCs is slowly adopting the EU rules in force. The four EU procedures for awarding procurement are: open procedure, restricted procedure, negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue (see about:http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l22009.htm). Note that prior than the promulgation of Government Decree n. 163/2006, in Italy there was a di¤erent classi…cation for the awarding procedures which comprised a longer list of procedures than the one set in the EU regulation, therefore the AVCP database records them accordingly to the legislation in force during the period 2000-2006 (i.e. Law n. 109/1994 and D.P.R. n. 554/1999). We have here aggregated these data according to the EU classi…cation which is currently in force in Italy. 1 3 In principle, delays in the PPC completion time weigh di¤erently on the contract value depending on the procedure adopted in awarding. In the "negotiated" procedure, the contract value is directly agreed between the parties and includes an explicit trade-o¤ between the contract value and the investment's delivery time. Instead, in the "open" procedure, the investment's execution time can itself be part of the successful bid, thus representing a strategic variable in the competition among bidders. Bajari and Lewis (2009) investigated theoretically and empically the e¤ects of awarding separately completion time and contract costs in Minnesota highway procurements. They highlighted that large improvements in social welfare are possibile through the adoption of the scoring rule where contractors bid for the two items separately with respect to the case where contractors bid only for contract costs. 1 4 All these three correlations are stastically signi…cant at 0.01 level. 1 5 Inspections of the database highilight that the high ratio recorded for PPCs in Southern Italy for the range between 5,000,000 and 15,000,000 Euros seems mainly driven by only one contract for road resurfacing awarded by the municipality of Naples: this contract records a delay in execution which corresponds to about eleven times the contracted completion time. 
Judicial enforcement of penalty for delay in Italian PPCs
In the following, we speci…cally address the probability of judicial enforcement of the rule for delay in PPC execution. We …rst refer to previous analyses where judicial enforcement is related to the 'quality' of the judicial system and provide empirical evidence for the Italian case. We then discuss how judicial enforcement is a¤ected by the discretionality of the court of law in voiding the penalty rule for delay and, speci…cally, we refer the discretionality of the court to the amount of the penalty committed. In a procurement setting, the key function of a court of law is essentially to force contractors to pay penalties when they fail to do so. Therefore, poor judicial enforcement -if foreseen -will increase the contractor's opportunistic behaviour, i.e. the contractor will have de facto an incentive to delay the completion of the PPC. Thus, in our analysis, we assume that the enforcement of a penalty is directly related to the average length of judicial processes as the threat of long trials reduces the probability of enforcement itself. 17 The average length for Italian civil justice to reach a …nal sentence is equal to 850 days, i.e. more than 2 years. Nevertheless, this ine¢ ciency is distributed di¤erently across the geographical macro-regions of Italy. More precisely, the judicial ine¢ ciency in civil trial is very marked in Southern Italy (1015 average days to reach a …nal sentence) compared to both the Northern and Central regions (respectively 646 and 648 days on average).
A further issue a¤ecting the probability of enforcement of rules in PPCs is related to the role played by the court of law as an active player in observing ex-post unforeseen contingencies: in this context the court could decide whether to void or enforce a contract's rule. If we apply Anderlini et al.'s (2007) analysis to our procurement setting, we can observe similar e¤ects when committed penalties for delays in delivery date are signi…cant: in these cases the court can choose to not enforce the penalty rule and apply the "principle of liquidated damage" which only considers enforceable the penalty corresponding to the "reasonable damage"su¤ered by the procurer (and/or consumers, etc.). In other words, the probability of enforcement of the penalty by the court is here related to the level of the committed penalty since the court's discretionality in contract enforcement increases with the amount of the penalty.
Referring to Italian PPCs, unfortunately, the AVCP database does not provide information about the level of penalties which have been committed for delays in execution and which have actually been paid by contractors. However, using the information provided on the delayed days for each contract's execution and the minimum and maximum level of penalty fees as de…ned by the Italian Law (respectively 0.03% and 0.1% of the contract value for each day of delay in delivering the asset), 19 we present in Table 2 the average penalty that should have been committed in Italian PPCs by range of contract value and macro-regional area. This was done by multiplying the average number of delayed days for each range of contract values by 0.03% and 0.1% respectively (i.e. for the minimum and maximum penalty fee for each day of delay set by the Italian Law).
The data in Table 2 show that the percentage of the estimated penalty over the total value of the PPC tends to increase with contract value except for the very high value projects (over 15,000,000 Euros). This is due to two main facts: …rst, according to Italian Law, the penalty is calculated as a percentage of the contract's value; second, as noted in Figure 1 , the ratio of average delayed days over contracted days decreases with a contract's value. In particular, for very high value contracts, a reduction in the average delayed days more than compensates for an increase in the penalty amount. payment rules adopted: if the payment to the contractor is divided up into the contract's execution stages, a direct cost for the contractor arises as -given the halt in the PPC execution -it is not fully rewarded. 1 20 
A model for optimal penalty fee in PPCs
In this section, we consider the case where a Contracting Authority (CA) awards a public procurement contract (PPC) to an economic operator (i.e. a contractor …rm) to build a public infrastructure with exogenous and ex-ante de…ned technical characteristics. 21 We assume that the contractor is selected according to a 'negotiated' procedure: that is, the CA …rst consults some economic operators of its choice and then agrees on the terms of the contract with only one of them. 22 Moreover, the project (e.g. the building of a public infrastructure) is of a …xed size. 23 According to the PPC, the contractor commits itself to constructing the infrastructure at time t in return for a …xed payment p, which is agreed on by both parties. To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that the infrastructure can be built instantaneously, at the estimated cost C t p. Furthermore, the contract includes the contractor's liability for completion on time, i.e. if the contractor delays the contracted delivery date it will pay a constant penalty c for each period (i.e. for each day) of delay. In Appendix A we present an extension of our model to the -realistic, but not frequent -case where the contractor is punished/rewarded if it decides to delay/anticipate the delivery date, i.e. to the case where the PPC includes a penalty/premium rule.
Under these assumptions, the net bene…t for a risk-neutral contractor (i.e. the project's Net Present Value, NPV henceforth) that complies with the contract delivery time is given by:
where C t p is the estimated cost of building the infrastructure at time t; when the contract is signed.
However, the introduction of the penalty clause gives -de facto -the contractor some ‡exibility in deciding its optimal time-to-completion. This investment timing ‡exibility has a value that should be added to the project's NPV as expressed in (1). In particular, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the project's cost C t evolves over time according to a geometric Brownian motion:
where R 0 is the drift and > 0 is the volatility of the cost process. Under this assumption, the contractor's possibility of deferring the infrastructure's completion date becomes analogous to a Perpetual Put Option whose value is equal to:
where t E t (e r( t) )F and t E t R t ce r(s t) ds . t is the expected and discounted net bene…t from investing at a general cost C < C t , t is the expected value of the penalty at time t, 2 [0; 1] is the probability that a third party -i.e. a court of law -is able to enforce the penalty, r is the risk-adjusted expected rate of return that investors would require to invest in the project, 26 and is the exercise time of the option.
According to (3), since t = 1 E t (e r( t) ) c r , the ex-ante value of the procurement contract for the contractor is (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994):
di¤erent according to geographic area where the PPC is executed (from 0.03 in Central Italy to 0.1 in Southern Italy, and to 0.05 in Northern Italy). 2 4 The assumption that the project is built instantaneously can be relaxed without substantially altering the results. Let us assume that it takes "time-to-build" the project but there is a maximum rate k at which the …rm can invest in every period (year). Therefore, denoting the total expenditure with Ct, it takes T = Ct=k periods (years) to complete the project. Assuming that the expenditures are made continuously over T , their present value is:
However, noting that e rC t =k ' 1 r C t k + :::; we getĈt ' Ct and the analysis can proceed pretty much as in the text. 2 5 In the following equation, dzt is the increment of a standard Brownian process with mean zero and variance dt (Dixit, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) . 2 6 The discount rate r can either be adjusted for risk or the expectation for the discount factor can be taken with respect to a risk-adjusted probability measure with r as the risk-free discount rate (Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 1979) . 2 7 When it is established in the PPC that the CA can revoke the contract if the total penalty reaches an upper bound G; the previous Perpetual Put Option in (2) turns into an American Put Option, with maturity time T , as follows:
Modelling this option is more complicated than the previous (2) but the results do not substantially di¤er. (4), we obtain the …nal expression for P t as:
Equation (5) states that for any …xed p; whenever P t > F t , it will be pro…table for the contractor to infringe the contract's provision on the investment's delivery date. In particular, the contractor will be better o¤ by maximizing (5) with respect to F in order to determine its optimal delay. The net bene…t that will trigger the …rm's investment is:
Equation (6) yields the following investment rule: if F F t , it is optimal for the contractor to invest immediately, while if F > F t , it is optimal to wait until the net bene…t is equal to F . Finally, if the CA wishes to incentivate the …rm to respect the contractual time, it must …x a penalty fee such that F = F t : From (6), the optimal penalty fee is now:
which, ceteris paribus, depends on ; (via ) and C t . According to (7) , if the CA expects a low probability and/or a high current investment cost C t (i.e. for decreasing NPV), it should increase the value of the penalty fee to discourage the …rm from delays. Futhermore, since d(( 1)= )=d > 0, according to (7) an increase in uncertainty would induce the CA to set a higher penalty fee.
We now investigate the probability of the penalty enforcement more deeply: speci…cally, we assume that a low probability of penalty enforcement may arise from at least two di¤erent sources. First, if the court of law -to which the parties refer in case of dispute -considers the committed penalty to be "excessive", it may decide not to enforce it or to reduce it to an extent estimated as reasonably covering the damages caused by the contractor's breach. 30 In order to include this case in our model, we assume that the probability of enforcement by the court depends on the value of penalty c with the properties that 0 (c) < 0; (c) = 1 and lim c!1 (c) = 0, where c 0 represents the minimum time unit value (i.e. fee per day) considered reasonable by the court of law as ex ante foreseen by the CA. 31 A second element a¤ecting the enforceability of the penalty clause is the 'quality'(e¢ ciency) of the judicial system. Following Guasch et al. (2006, p.60), we thus multiply the probability (c) 2 8 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994), p. 315-316. 2 9 The …rst order condition is:
In the literature on …rm breach of contract, this discretionality by the court of law is commonly referred to as the "liquidated damage principle". Delay in delivering the contracted investment should be referred to as a speci…c case of the …rm's breach of the contract, and the court can apply the above principle to cover the reasonable damage caused to society by delays. For a discussion of the application of the "liquidate damage principle" in PPCs, see 3 1 In the US experience of PPC in the highway construction industry, the "unit time value" is typically expressed as a cost per day. It is calculated by the State highway agency (the CA in our model) referring to the "daily road-user cost", which include items such as travel time, travel distance, fuel expense, etc. See Herbsman et al. (1995) for an example of the "daily road-user cost" calculation used by the Kansas Department of Transportation.
by a parameter 2 [0; 1] which refers to the average time that the court of law takes to resolve disputes. 32 According to these assumptions on the probability of the penalty's enforcement, the optimal penalty design (7) is now given by the implicit function:
In order to illustrate the properties of (8) with reference to the Italian case, in what follows, we …rst provide some numerical solutions (see Tables 3, 4 , 5, 6 below) and discuss them referring to the maximum and minimum value of the penalty fee set by Italian legislation. We further specify di¤erent values for according to data on the average length of ordinary civil trials in di¤erent Italian regional areas (see previous Table 1 ) and compare results for (8) according to the macro areas where the contracts are executed -Northern and Central Italy vs Southern Italy (see Figures  2, 3, 4, 5 below) .
Let us calculate (8) . Regarding the probability of enforcement, we assume (c) = (c=c) for c c. In other words, when the CA sets a penalty higher than c, an increase in elasticity determines a rapid decrease in probability . If the elasticity is less than one, so that higher values of c are deemed excessive by the court, increasing values of both and C t lead to higher optimal penalties. In the calibration, c takes the values of 0:03% and 0:1%; which are respectively the lower and upper limits of the penalty fee in PPC as set by Italian legislation while elasticity takes two di¤erent values, = 0:3 and = 0:5, respectively.
All the above assumptions allow us to rewrite equation (8) as follows:
The choice of parameters for the calibration is made following as much as possible indications from related studies ( Finally, interpreting as the probability that a court of law is able to resolve a dispute in a year, in order to gauge the e¤ect of the 'quality'of the judicial system throughout Italy we set 1= = 3 so as to refer to the average number of years the Italian courts take to resolve legal disputes. 36 The results of the simulations show that, according to the Real Option Theory, the higher the investment cost, C t , and/or the uncertainty, , the higher the optimal penalty c . In other words, both the investment cost C t and the uncertainty incentivate the …rm to defer the contracted investment which, in turn, would call for higher penalties to make the …rm comply with the contracted execution time. Tables 3 and 4 below show the optimal penalties obtained by simulations of (9) for c = 0:03%, and = 0:3 and = 0:5 respectively, while Tables 5 and 6 show the optimal penalties obtained by simulations of (9) for c = 0:1%, and = 0:3 and = 0:5 respectively. In all these Tables it can be observed that the higher the values of C t and , the higher the optimal penalty c . In addition, it is evident that the optimal penalties are highly sensitive to the values of both c and . Speci…cally, when the value of the penalty considered reasonable by the court of law is c = 0:03% , if the elasticity of the probability is = 0:3 or = 0:5 (Table 3 and 4), the optimal penalty c always exceeds c. In these cases c is sub-optimal, and would induce the contractor to delay the investment. This delay would increase as the NPV decreases (Tables 3 and 4) . By contrast, when the value of the reasonable penalty by the court of law is c = 0:1%, if the elasticity of the probability is = 0:3 (Table 5 ), the optimal penalty c is higher than 0:1% only for a high value of C t and/or . In all the other cases, the CA will …nd it convenient to set the penalty fee equal to 0:1% and the contractor will …nd it convenient to comply with the contractual delivery date. In olther words, the penalty fee is correctly set and the probability of enforcement is equal to 1 (perfect enforceability). Note that all the results according to which the CA …nds it convenient to set the fee equal to c are in the Tables highlighted in yellow.
The results displayed in Table 6 show that for = 0:5, the CA …nds it convenient to set the fee which presumes reasonable for the court (i.e. to set c = 0:1%) only when C t = 0:7 and = 0:3 (i.e for greater NPV and lower volatility); in all other cases the optimal penalty is always greater than 0.1%.
To sum up, if a …rm's pro…tability on signing a contract is high and the volatility on future investment costs, C t , is low, the contractor will not defer the investment. This allows the CA to set the penalty equal to the one proposed by the court. On the contrary, if the NPV is low and the volatility is high, the contractor will …nd it convenient to defer the investments, and by contrast the CA will set a penalty higher than c in order to induce the contractor to comply with the contracted delivery date. Table 3 : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:03%, = 1=3; = 0, r = 5%, = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days Table 4 : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and , c = 0:03%, = 1=3; = 0, r = 5%, = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days Table 5 : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and , c = 0:1%, = 1=3; = 0, r = 5%, = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days Table 6 : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:1%, = 1=3; = 0, r = 5%, = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days Finally, we perform simulations to test the e¤ects of the quality of the judicial system on the optimal penalty (Figure 2, 3, 4, 5 ). As outlined in Section 2.2, the average length of ordinary civil trials in the three Italian macro-regions are very similar for Northern and Central Italy (which can be therefore considered together) and shorter than in the South. Therefore, referring to Table 1 , we assumed = 0:5 for Northern and Central Italy (NCI henceforth), and = 0:25 for Southern Italy (SI henceforth) respectively. These parameters imply that the average length of ordinary civil trials is respectively 1= = 2 years for NCI and 1= = 4 years for SI.
The results obtained for the case of Italy do not vary qualitatively if we consider NCI and SI separately: the optimal penalty in both cases increases monotonically in C t and . However, it is important to stress here that the optimal penalty decreases for increasing value of : indeed, note that in the Figures below the plane for = 0:5 lays always below that for = 0:25. Figures 2, 3 , 4, 5, show that i) the optimal penalty set for PPCs awarded and executed in SI should always be greater than the one set in NCI; ii) the spread between the optimal penalty in NCI and the one in SI increases for increasing values of C t (i.e. decreasing NPV) and .
These …ndings are consistent with the empirical evidence on delays reported in the AVCP's survey on Italian PPCs. Indeed, according to the AVCP's dataset, the SI records on average the highest number of delayed days. This reveals that, because the penalty fee is not di¤erentiated by regional areas, in SI contractors …nd it optimal to delay the delivery date more frequently than in NCI. Finally, it is important to consider the dynamics of the optimal penalties speci…cally considering the two variables analysed here: the NPV (p C t ) and the uncertainty e¤ect ( ) focusing on the spread between NCI and SI optimal penalties. In this regard, it can be noted that the pro…tability e¤ect is stronger than the uncertainty e¤ect (the plane with = 0:25 increases more sharply than the plane with = 0:5). This seems to suggest that the lower the NPV (the higher C t ), the longer the delay and, consequently, the higher the optimal penalty should be. Referring to the Italian macro-regions, this means that a low pro…tability contract in the SI exhibits more delayed days than in NCI, ceteris paribus: this result is explained in our model by a less e¢ cient judicial system in SI, which implies a low probability that the penalty will be enforced and, consequently, paid.
Final remarks
Delays in investment execution are a negative by-product of public procurement because they can: i) increase the original costs of the contract, thus producing direct negative e¤ects for the CA; ii) in ‡ict a negative externality on consumers which would directly bene…t from the contract's completion. This is a relevant issue for the performance of PPCs in Italy where -as documented in Section 2 -about 78% of contracts awarded in the period 2000-2006 were executed with delays.
In many countries procurement contracts usually include penalty clauses for each day of delay to induce the contractor to respect the contracted delivery timing. To date, the e¤ectiveness of penalty rules for delay in PPC, has never been speci…cally investigated. Our paper takes a step in this direction, answering the following research questions: given the evidence of long delays, is there something wrong with the de…nition of these penalty clauses? How should the optimal penalty fee be determined?
We presented a model starting from the assumption that penalty clauses give -to some extentthe contractor the option of deciding the investment timing for the PPC's execution. To be "optimally" set, these penalties should take into account the value of this investment timing ‡exibility, which then a¤ects the contract's value. Adopting a Real Option approach, our model illustrates that uncertainty over investment costs increases the penalty fee set to induce the contractor to respect the delivery timing. Moreover, our model investigates whether the ine¢ ciency of penalty rules is caused by di¢ -culties in their enforcement. For this purpose, we speci…cally explored judicial ine¢ ciency of the penalty enforcement in two directions. First of all, we assumed that the court's discretionality in enforcing the penalty increases with the committed penalty, and this -in turn -reduces the probability of penalty enforcement. Secondly, we assumed that the penalty enforcement is lower as the 'quality'of the judicial system decreases. As a measure of the 'quality'of the judicial system we adopted the average length of ordinary civil trials: the longer the average length of trials, the lower the 'quality'of the judicial system. The model's predictions on penalty enforcement received support from calibrations we perform on the Italian case: our …ndings show that i) the higher the investment cost, C t , and/or the uncertainty, , the higher the optimal penalty c and ii) the optimal penalty is highly sensitive to the 'quality'of the judicial system and to the discretional power of the court. As the average 'quality' of the judicial system di¤ers among the Italian macro-regions (see Table 1 ), our results record di¤erent levels of optimal penalty for the Northern and Central parts of Italy (NCI) and the Southern part (SI). Speci…cally, the optimal penalty to be set for PPCs in SI should always be greater than the one to be set in NCI, ceteris paribus.
We also found that the spread between the optimal penalty in NCI and in SI increases for increasing values of the investment cost C t (i.e. decreasing pro…tability) and uncertainty . Nevertheless, the pro…tability of investments weighs more than the uncertainty (the spread increases more slightly with respect to than C t ). This means that when the pro…tability decreases, the delay increases, and consequently this would call for a higher optimal penalty in SI than in NCI.
Thus, as for the Italian case, the theoretical predictions of our simple model and its calibration seem to explain the evidence of the puzzling ine¢ ciency of the penalty rule for delays in the PPCs. At present, the excessive length of ordinary civil trials in Italian judicial districts is common knowledge for all the economic agents: on this ground, if a contractor expects that the CA will not apply to the court to enforce a disputed penalty for delay in completion, it will optimally delay the investment, looking forward -at best -to a renegotiation of the contract with the CA. Moreover, if the contractor considers the case where the CA will apply to the court to enforce the disputed penalty, it knows that the higher the value of the committed penalty, the larger the discretionality of the court in reducing, or even in not enforcing, the committed penalty. These e¤ects would invalidate the direct incentives produced by the rule itself and would -in some cases -call for higher optimal penalties than those set according to the Italian regulation on public procurement contracts.
A Appendix

A.1 A penalty/premium model
In Section 3 we investigated how a PPC should comprise a penalty clause for delay designed to optimally induce the contractor to invest at contracted time t. Many PPCs, however, commit the contractor to invest at a future date t 0 > t and also include an incentive/disincentive (I/D) clause stating that, on the one hand, if the contractor is able to complete the project ahead of schedule t 0 it will be entitled to premium fee I whilst, on the other hand, if the contractor delays completion, a penalty D will be imposed.
Although the CA may introduce di¤erent and alternative I/D designs, we consider here the simplest one where the …rm receives a constant premium/penalty fee c for each period (day, month, year, etc.) with which it anticipates/delays the investment with respect to t 0 > t: 39 In other words, the present section investigates how this I/D rule -where the premium and the penalty are identically de…ned in their amounts, but with opposite signs -should be optimally designed.
Following the approach presented in section 3, the current NPV, say N , of the project for the contractor complying with the contractual delivery time now becomes:
The inclusion in the procurement contract of an I/D rule makes the contractor's investment decision equivalent to exercising a Perpetual Put Option whose value is now given by P t t t ; where t and are as in (3) and t (i.e. the expected value of the premium/penalty at time t) is now equal to:
where the expected value E t is calculated with respect to both and the probability that is lower (greater) than t 0 : 3 9 Herbsman et al., 1995 pointed out that in the real world when CAs adopt the I/D rule, the same value for both the incentive and the disincentive fee is generally used. 4 0 Note that if t 0 is set by the CA to allow the contractor to maximize the NPV (10), depending on the parameter values, t 0 is greater than t only if r < : In particular, maximizing (10) we obtain:
which is an increasing function of the current investment cost Ct and is always greater than t if r < p C t : In the case of r = ; we get Nt = e r(t 0 t) Ft: Since Ft > 0 it is optimal to invest immediately, i.e. t 0 = t. If r > the solution of the …rst order condition represents a minimum as
and the optimal value coincides with one of the boundaries, i.e. it is given by max [Ft; lim t 0 !1 Nt] : However, since lim t 0 !1 Nt = 0 it is still optimal to invest immediately. 4 where the optimal exercise time is de…ned as = min (t 0 j F = arg max P t )
According to (13) , at time t, the probability of having a bonus is the probability of having an optimal exercise time less than (or equal to) the contractual time t 0 . In other words, this is the probability of the geometric Brownian motion F t reaching the critical value F within [t; t 0 ] starting from an initial condition F t < F . This can be expressed as (Harrison, 1985) Pr (
where:
By (14), we rewrite (12) as: According to (3) and (4) the PPC's ex-ante value where an I/D rule is included is now:
which should be maximized with respect to F : From (15), if the contractual time is very long, i.e. t 0 ! 1, the second term on the left hand side (l.h.s.) disappears and the contractor will get the premium by investing before t 0 with probability one. If, conversely, the contractual time t 0 is very short, i.e. t 0 ! t; the second term on the l.h.s. of (15) decreases to c r as in (5) . The contractor will then incur a penalty since, with probability one, it invests when the contractual time is over. Finally, because the term (15) as a constant, the optimal investment trigger F is still given by (6) as well as the …rm's investment decision rule. In other words, the contractor defers the infrastructure delivery date until F t reaches trigger F for the …rst time. In this respect, if exercise time is lower than t 0 , the contractor gains a premium, otherwise it must pay a fee. As in the text, whenever P t > N t it will be pro…table for the contractor to infringe the contractual time t 0 : Thus, the di¤erence P t N t represents the contractor's opportunity cost in delivering 18 the investment according to the contracted date t 0 instead of taking advantage of the investment timing ‡exibility which pertains to the I/D clause.
We complete the analysis by calculating the optimal I/D fee which induces the contractor to respect the completion date t 0 . In this regard, since the exercise time is stochastic and c is constant (i.e. c is not contingent on ), the CA must set a policy-rule referring to the probability distribution of . For the sake of simplicity, we follow the simple average-time rule 42 :
In this case, the mean time that F t , with starting point F t > F ; takes to reach the upper trigger F for the …rst time is given by:
with m ( To obtain (17), we consider the process C t on an interval 0 < a < C t < b < 1; with left boundary a and right boundary b: De…ning t a;b as the stochastic variable that describes the time it takes C t to hit for the …rst time either a or b; we are able to evaluate the …rst moment (Saphores, 2002) :
:Since > 0; for b ! 1 and a ! C < C t we obtain the expected time that the construction cost will take to reach the lower boundary C starting from C t :
To prove this limit, let us consider the …rst and second term separately:
Putting the two limits together, we get:
According to (17) and (16), the optimal penalty is then equal to:
Since when t 0 = t and t 0 > t, (18) is respectively equal to or smaller than (7), the results obtained in the previous section can be replicated for the I/D scheme as well. It is worth noting that as (t 0 t) increases, the optimal I/D fee diminishes. In other words, when the contractual time t 0 is a long way from the current time t; the incentive for the contractor to delay the investment decreases and the CA is able to minimize premium outpayment by undercutting the I/D fee. When the interval t 0 t is very long, we have the paradox that the contractor must somehow be incentivated, by means of an incentive fee, to respect the contracted delivery date for the investment. This Appendix includes: Tables on the empirical Here we report other simulations of the optimal penalty by changing some key parameters. Tables  2A, 3A , 4A, 5A display the results of simulations obtained for the Italian case (i.e. 1= = 3) when < 0, r = 0:1% and = 0:3,0:4; 0:5. Tables 6A, 7A , 8A, 9A display the results of simulations obtained for the Italian case (i.e. 1= = 3) when < 0:05 and r = 0:5%. Tables 10A, 11A , 12A, 13A display the results of simulations obtained for the Italian case (i.e. 1= = 3) when < 0:05 and r = 0:5%. Tables 10A, 11A, 12A, 13A. Figures 1A illustrates the optimal penalty obtained for the NCI (i.e. 1= = 2) and SI (i.e. 1= = 4) when = 0 and r = 0:1%. Figures 2A and 3A illustrate the optimal penalty obtained for the NCI (i.e. 1= = 2) and SI (i.e. 1= = 4) when < 0 and r = 5%; 10% respectively. Table 2A : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:03%, = 1=3; = 0, r = 10%, = 0:3 expressed in pecentage and in terms of days Table 3A : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:03%, = 1=3; = 0, r = 10%, = 0:5 expressed in pecentage and in terms of days Table 4A : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:1%, = 1=3; = 0, r = 10%, = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days Table 5A : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:1%, = 1=3; = 0, r = 10%, = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days 23 Table 6A : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:03%, = 1=3; = 0:05, r = 5%, = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days Table 7A : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:03%, = 1=3; = 0:05, r = 5%, = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days Table 8A : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:1%, = 1=3; = 0:05, r = 5%, = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days Table 9A : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:1%, = 1=3; = 0:05, r = 5%, = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days Table 10A : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:03%, = 1=3; = 0:05, r = 5%, = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days 24 Table 11A : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:03%, = 1=3; = 0:05, r = 10%, = 0:5 expressed in percentage and in terms of days Table 12A : Optimal penalty for di¤erent values of C t and ; c = 0:1%, = 1=3; = 0:05, r = 5%, = 0:3 expressed in percentage and in terms of days 
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A.2 Other Tables and Simulations
